ONE OF AIRPOWER'S FOUNDING FATHERS

A Book Review by
THOMAS A. KEANEY

MacArthur's Airman: General George C. Kenney and the War in the Southwest Pacific
by Thomas E. Griffith, Jr.
Lawrence, Kans.: University of Kansas Press, 1998. 338 pp. $39.95
[ISBN 0–7006–0909–1]

As an airman with the credentials of a founding father, George C. Kenney championed the innovative and flexible use of aircraft, developing many concepts now typical of modern warfare. A new biography, *MacArthur's Airman: General George C. Kenney and the War in the Southwest Pacific* by Thomas Griffith, superbly portrays these accomplishments. Essentially, as other airmen of his time made their names in strategic bombing operations against Germany and Japan, Kenney pioneered control of the air, airlifting men and supplies, suppressing enemy air defenses, operating from sparse bases, and other activities common to the theater air commander today. His career deserves the attention of not just airmen, but of anyone who is involved in joint operations.

The author, an Air Force officer himself, fills a gap in the literature on American airpower with a remarkable account that will no doubt be the standard work on Kenney for years to come. Aside from an autobiographical memoir which was published in 1949 (*General Kenney Reports*), no other work on Kenney's wartime service in the Southwest Pacific has appeared. While Griffith uses Kenney's own writing extensively, he goes considerably beyond that, consulting both public and private archives as well as other published and unpublished sources. The result is a balanced treatment that offers background on events which occurred during Kenney's service and elaborates on key aspects of air operations which he influenced. Citing technical reports, official memoranda, flight logbooks, and the like, Griffith confirms some of Kenney's viewpoints, refutes others, and covers subjects that Kenney himself avoided or downplayed. While Griffith includes Kenney's service during World War I and the interwar period, the book is weighted toward his World War II experience. The account stops there, however, so we learn nothing of his subsequent years as the first commander of Strategic Air Command or later as the commander of Air University.


George Kenney in Manila, 1946.
U.S. Army

As *MacArthur's Airman* explains, Kenney's early career provided varied experiences that would aid him later. Before entering military service, he studied engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, then started a construction firm, building roads and bridges. Enthused by aviation early on, he made his first flight in 1910 thanks to a British flyer, Claude Graham-White, who was taking part in a competition in Boston where they met. That began his fascination with flying, and when America entered World War I, Kenney joined the Army Signal Corps, took flight training, and left for the front as an observation pilot. In France he located and photographed troop concentrations and also managed to shoot down two enemy aircraft, earn a Distinguished Service Cross and Silver Star, and establish his reputation as one of the Army's finest air commanders.

Griffith points out that Kenney not only had combat experience, but also taught tactics and doctrine, researched aircraft development and acquisition, and served as an operations staff officer. That gave him intimate knowledge of aircraft operations as well as aviation design and engineering. Indicative of Kenney's expertise is the fact that the Chief of the Air Corps, Major General Henry ("Hap") Arnold, sent him to France with Lieutenant Colonel Carl Spaatz as a special observer in April 1940. Kenney sent a report back to Washington that was focused not on doctrine, but on requirements for armored seats for pilots, leak-proof fuel tanks, and better high-altitude equipment, the nuts and bolts of combat operations.

Surprisingly for someone destined for high command, Kenney had only limited experience as a unit commander. In the interwar years he spent only two tours, each less than a year long, in command of an operational aircraft squadron, and those were not notable successes. In 1920, for instance, his observation squadron lost 22 of its 24 aircraft in less than a year under his leadership. It would take 18 years before he was

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Douglas A–20–A over Hawaii in 1941.

U.S. Air Force

offered another flying command, which he then had to accept in the form of a demotion: as a major he commanded an observation squadron, a position usually held by a lieutenant. Griffith notes but does not address reasons for this lack of command time or its effect. He does indicate, however, that Kenney's irreverent attitude toward his superiors on the Army General Staff caused his removal from staff positions.

Most of the book deals with Kenney's wartime role under General Douglas MacArthur, and here the author displays considerable insight into the nature of Kenney's contributions. Much of his experience was gained while serving as MacArthur's air commander in the Southwest Pacific from 1942 until the end of the war. He operated in a theater with extensive distances between island air bases and scant resources in men and matériel. To even establish bases, he had to coordinate land, sea, and air operations to seize territory from the Japanese, then plan extensive engineering projects to carve operating bases out of the jungle. Airpower doctrine developed in the interwar period had little to offer on such matters so Kenney improvised both air operations and aircraft. His flexibility made island-hopping campaigns possible, operations that characterized MacArthur's push through New Guinea and the South Pacific to the Philippines. Although they often disagreed, MacArthur said of his senior airman: "Nothing that Spaatz or any other air officer has accomplished in the war compares to what Kenney has contributed and none in my opinion is his equal in ability."

Kenney emphasized control of the air in every operation. First, since he had to work with aircraft units scattered many miles apart with poor communications between bases—a far different situation than that faced by 8th Air Force bases in England—Kenney formed what he called air task forces. This brought together elements of flying units from several bases for a specific campaign. These units then operated from a single base to facilitate coordination and planning. The Air Force composite wings of the early 1990s reflect this concept.

Second, Kenney dealt with the problem of scarce resources by fostering innovation and motivating his entire command to follow this example. He kept aircraft in service by scavenging parts from downed planes and modifying plans to meet particular theater needs. Most importantly, he gave extra attention and decorated ground officers and airmen who devised new procedures or modified available equipment to meet other requirements.

Finally, Griffith cites Kenney's ability to adapt command organization to fit circumstances. Army doctrine called for establishing an air support command in which aircraft and targeting would be under the control of ground commanders, not air commanders. Kenney opposed such a command because of limited resources in his theater, instead issuing orders that kept these responsibilities in his command. MacArthur supported the concept. These arrangements mirrored developments in the North African theater where General Dwight Eisenhower recommended a similar realignment. Anyone interested in current debates over the joint force air component commander, priority given to close air support, and joint targeting should study these earlier struggles over airpower.

It is worth noting that Griffith does not shrink from considering Kenney's shortcomings. Like many of his contemporaries, Kenney thought the Japanese racially inferior and less capable of becoming first class aviators, which led to inaccurate estimates of the enemy. Griffith also notes that Kenney disliked the Navy and was reluctant to cooperate in joint operations or share assets. But Kenney's difficulties also extended to members of his own service. His drive to secure B–29s ran contrary to Arnold's plans, and his continued insistence on obtaining them aggravated relations with Arnold and others at a time when the Army Air Force sought to present a united front on B–29 use. Griffith is probably correct in asserting that Kenney's close association with MacArthur led to a perception that Kenney had divided loyalties in the airpower debate. Moreover, Kenney had long been known for his combativeness in organizational infighting.

MacArthur's Airman portrays George Kenney as a cantankerous, single-minded advocate of airpower who possessed the technical and organizational skills to make it effective in the most difficult of circumstances. In his nuanced assessment of Kenney and his times, Griffith confirms the importance of Kenney in airpower history and sheds light on how airpower became integrated into the conduct of military operations. Issues that preoccupied Kenney—the value of intelligence, organizing theater air resources, coordinating land, sea, and air operations, and others—remain as vital today for joint warfighting as they did during his career. **JFQ**

THE GREYING OF AN ALLIANCE

A Book Review by
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NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security
by David S. Yost
Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999.
450 pp. $19.95
[ISBN 1–878379–81–X]

Written prior to the Alliance's intervention in Kosovo, *NATO Transformed,* by David Yost, is a prescient and thought-provoking look at the new European security environment. It addresses the fundamental question of the purpose of the North Atlantic Alliance and its post-Cold War roles. The author concludes that the organization is undergoing an ad hoc transformation to a mechanism for collective security in Europe. He considers continued American engagement, the gap between U.S. and European military capabilities, the difficulty in achieving consensus on defense policies, and the requirement for a U.N. mandate for NATO action, issues that were all at play in Kosovo.

With the central threat that provided the focus of Alliance defense planning and the rationale for its existence gone, questions on continued NATO existence and functions have been prominent in the debate over European security and the role of the United States. Despite recognition on both sides of the estuary that NATO was overtaken by events, it has adapted remarkably to a changed security environment. Rather than shrinking, it has grown both in members and missions.

The author provides a framework for analysis in the introduction by distinguishing between *collective defense*—traditional alliances against external threats—and *collective security*—compacts among states against threats to stability based on the principle that peace is indivisible. After a look at the Alliance during the Cold War, Yost turns to the metamorphosis of NATO in its fifth decade: cooperation with former enemies, enlargement, and crisis management and peace operations across a wider Europe.

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NATO 50th Anniversary Summit, 1999.

DOD (R.D. Ward)

NATO Transformed addresses these issues thoroughly. With meticulous scholarship and analysis, Yost reviews the evolution of the Alliance over the past decade with special emphasis on what the primary role of NATO should be in the post-Cold War era—its traditional core function of collective defense or broader and more demanding cooperative security missions. He deduces that NATO must do both. "The United States and its allies will have little choice but to pursue a two track policy . . . pursuing collective security aspirations to the extent that this is feasible and prudent, but maintaining collective defense posture as a hedge in case those aspirations cannot be fulfilled." However Yost is concerned that in embracing new roles, to include crisis management, peacekeeping operations, and extensive institutional arrangements with former adversaries, NATO risks losing the military capabilities, cohesion, and focus necessary for collective defense.

The heart of this book is the analysis of NATO roles in crisis management and intervention outside the territory of its members and the impact these functions may have on the core mission of collective defense. The author asserts that ambitious and demanding non-Article 5 operations such as those conducted in the Balkans have become the main focus of force planning and operations. He recognizes the dilemma that confronts decisionmakers between preparing for a range of likely security challenges in the region which do not directly threaten vital allied interests—notably in the former Yugoslavia—and preparing for more demanding but less likely threats of an attack on allied territory. If the Alliance limited its focus to the traditional mission of collective defense, its military capabilities would atrophy and it would be seen as a vestige of the Cold War with decreasing relevance. On the other hand, an undisciplined involvement in the range of conflicts that dot the Euro-Atlantic region, in keeping with the "peace is indivisible" concept, risks undermining allied cohesion, overextending military forces, and diminishing the capability to fulfill the core collective defense mission.

Yost concludes that, despite frequent references to collective security in NATO documents, in practice the allies have been selective in determining when and how to intervene in non-Article 5 contingencies. Yost uses the term "cooperative security" to describe the consensus-based coalitions of the willing. Theory is following practice as it has throughout Alliance history. Its doctrine is being written in response to the wars of Yugoslav succession. While Yost is concerned that NATO may overreach, his well-considered judgment is that the Allies are likely to remain cautious about engaging in conflicts beyond members' territory. The difficulty of achieving and maintaining cohesion in Kosovo reinforces his assessment.

The strategic concept adopted at the Washington Summit falls short of the author's call for the Allies to preserve the core common defense mission and clarify its collective security activities. While the concept that emerged from the 50th Anniversary Summit states that NATO

"must maintain collective defense," it gives greater attention to new challenges including crisis management. The rhetoric and actions of the post-1989 period have centered on broader security requirements. And NATO's only uses of force in its history were not in response to attacks on an ally but to affronts to human rights and regional stability. The author argues that the core collective defense mission and integrated military structure must be maintained and that the military capabilities to perform this mission are being eroded. The Alliance thus risks overextension in taking on a wider range of security functions.

A major threat to collective defense and cohesion is the decline in European military capabilities. The much heralded peace dividend of the immediate post-Cold War years is still alive and well on the Continent and has led to a marked drop in forces available for combat operations and a growing technological gap between European and American militaries. This breach, obvious during the Persian Gulf War and in NATO air operations over Bosnia, surfaced in Kosovo where most combat sorties and virtually all precision strikes were conducted by the United States. Unless this trend is halted, effective military capabilities will increasingly rest with U.S. forces given low threat perceptions and continued cuts in European defense budgets. This is a formula for acrimony within Alliance councils and for criticism by Congress of American commitments in Europe.

This book is a must read for anyone interested in European security and NATO. Yost has focused on key issues relating to evolving Alliance roles in crisis management and peace operations beyond the frontiers of member nations. He concludes that NATO is not endeavoring to establish a Wilsonian system of collective security but rather has adapted on an ad hoc and selective basis to the range of challenges in a post-Cold War Europe. Yost's warning that the Alliance must retain and improve its collective defense capabilities as a hedge against untoward developments in Russia and as a base for crisis management and peace operations is right on the mark.

In the final analysis there is little sign that our European allies will take the necessary steps, especially increasing defense spending, to arrest a decline in forces and the growing technological gap which is developing between Europe and the United States. **JFQ**

GLOBALIZATION FOR DUMMIES

A Book Review by
JOHN A. NAGL

The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization
by Thomas L. Friedman
New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1999. 394 pp. $27.50
[ISBN 0–374–19203–0]

From the collapse of the Soviet Union to the Asian financial crisis to unending ethnic wars in the Balkans, the world appears to be operating under new rules on the eve of the 21st century. But who can crack the code on the new world disorder? Tom Friedman claims to be that man. A foreign affairs columnist for *The New York Times* and the winner of two Pulitzer Prizes for reporting from the Middle East, Friedman won a National Book Award for *From Beirut to Jerusalem* in 1988. Now in his second book, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, he turns to the interaction between international relations and global economics to decipher the late 20th century world with an unending gift of clarity.

Moreover, the title of the book actually makes sense. Lexus is a metaphor for globalization that the author perceives as the key organizing principle of the post-Cold War world. Globalization is a result of the integration of world financial markets, nation states, and technological advances on an unprecedented scale. It is a process that is altering everything from how people buy books to how wars are fought. Globalization, through information technology and a global marketplace, is increasingly shaping the world in the image of America. This fact is not universally popular, and Friedman argues that many nations and people will resist by holding onto the olive tree, which represents "everything that roots us, anchors us, identifies us, and locates us in the world."

One irony of the technological and economic forces that are shaping the world today is that they dramatically increase the power of individuals and small groups. As a result, those who resist the Americanization of their olive trees can present a real threat—what Friedman calls "the backlash against the system." Usama bin Laden and the World Trade Center bombers—as well as domestic terrorists who bombed the Murrah building in Oklahoma City in protest against government policy—typify the new dangers of a globalized world.

Friedman explicitly reflects upon much of the post-Cold War literature. Like the Tofflers in *The Third Wave*, he assumes that the information revolution will forever change human existence. And like Francis Fukuyama in *The End of History and the Last Man*, he considers that the eclipse of communism leaves no alternative to democratic capitalism as an organizing principle for states. Friedman also disputes the conclusion reached by Samuel Huntington in *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* that cultural forces will inevitably destabilize the international community and the thesis promoted by Paul Kennedy in *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers* that the United States, like all previous great powers, is heading for a fall.

But one need not consult other authors to appreciate Friedman's argument, which is why his book has been dubbed "Globalization for Dummies." Many of his stories, although amusing, have deeper meanings which make the point. Among them is the tale of an Israeli boy who asked Martin Indyk, the American ambassador, for his autograph at the opening of the first McDonald's in Jerusalem. The teenager, who thought Indyk was an envoy from McDonald's, did not want an autograph on discovering Indyk represented the United States and not the golden arches.

Many readers will be more interested in the defense rather than the diplomatic implications of globalization. In this area Friedman relies on a political theorist, Michael Doyle, who noted that economically advanced, liberal democracies have never fought each other. If all the great powers are liberal democracies, they comprise a zone of peace in which war is essentially inconceivable. However, democracies account for only a seventh of the world population. Other nations around the globe—which are not liberal democracies or do not have industrialized capitalist economies, or either—do not enjoy the same freedom from war among states or conflict inside their own borders. Instead traditional balance of power politics, mercantilism, and instrumental nationalism have all too often made life "nasty, brutish, and short."

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This instability will require intervention by liberal democracies, under the leadership of the United States, to create the conditions for progress.

Friedman believes that it is not only the moral duty of liberal democracies to intervene, but that it is also in their interest; for those nations and individuals denied the rewards of globalization will strive to destroy the system. Therefore, the revolution in military affairs must be pursued not only to deter peer competitors, but to defeat potential enemies who long to return to the olive tree of fond memory—and who will use modern technology to do so. Bin Laden, for instance, coordinates his terror network via the Internet and cellphones.

The Lexus and the Olive Tree uses the concept of globalization to explain the current world order and predict the future direction of global events. To the extent the military understands the forces that drive history, we may even be able to prescribe directions for U.S. policy to make the future more favorable. In an increasingly complex and fast-moving world, the collapse of Asian currency markets or ancient nationalisms stirred up by tyrannical leaders may be the cause of conflicts that affect U.S. interests. This book is an owner's manual for the globalized world. Read it or be left behind. **JFQ**

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